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EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL POWER OF BAIL
The American public has never grasped the legal status of the pro-
fessional bondsman. While some persons understand his role in posting bond
pending trial, they are generally unaware of the bondsman's powers over his
principal during the time of the bail before the trial. In some respects the
bondsman's powers over the principal's person exceed those held by govern-
mental authority. It is the purpose of this note to point out the power of
the bondsman to pursue his absconding principal into another state, appre-
hend and forcibly return him, without resort to legal process.
One of the leading cases construing this power is In re Von der A he.1
In that case, the bondsman had pursued his principal from Pennsylvania into
Missouri where he apprehended him by authority of his Pennsylvania bail-
piece and returned him to Pennsylvania. The principal contended that he
had been deprived of his constitutional rights under article V and the
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The court, however,
held that no rights of the appellant were abridged. The court reasoned that
had this return been effected by the government, then such return would
have been unjustified unless there was resort to legal process of extradition.
The court distinguished the power of the bondsman to return his principal
on the grounds that the bondsman acts not by authority of the state or of
the court, but by virtue of his relationship to the principal. An arrest under
warrant depends upon court process, and therefore has no extra-jurisdictional
effect, but an arrest upon the bailpiece is made by virtue of contract and is,
therefore, not confined to any jurisdiction or locality.
This distinction was observed in the case of Nicolls v. Ingersoll,2 in
which the Supreme Court of New York said:
The power of taking and surrendering is not exercised under
any judicial process, but results from the nature of the undertaking
by the bail. The bailpiece is not a process, nor anything in the na-
ture of it, but is merely a record or memorial of the delivery of the
principal to his bail on security given. . . . According to this view
of the subject, it would seem necessarily to follow that, as between
the bail and his principal, the controlling power of the former over
the latter, may be exercised at all times and in all places; this
appears to me indispensable for the safety and security of the bail.
3
1. 85 Fed. 959 (1898).
2. 7 Johns. Cas. 111 (1810).
3. Id. at 156.
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Following this decision and similar holdings in Massachusetts 4 and Connecti-
cut,5 the Supreme Court of Vermont in Worthen v. Prescott6 held that:
bail may take the principal in another jurisdiction or another state,
on the ground that a valid contract made in one state is enforceable
in another, according to the law there. . . . This shows that the
authority need not be exercised by process, but that it inheres in
the bail itself; and that they may exercise it personally or depute
another to exercise it for them.
7
This power of the bondsman has long been recognized in Pennsylvania.
Judge Agnew stated in a case, not found in the State Reports, but rather in
Mason!s Petition :8
It is well settled that bail from another state may arrest his
principal in this state upon a bailpiece, or depute another to do it,
and take him out of the state for the purpose of surrendering him
in discharge of his recognizance.
In the case of Respublica v. Gaoler of Philadelphia,9 the court recognized
the right of the bondsman but placed a limitation upon its exercise. In
that case the principal was sued in Virginia, and a bondsman had posted
bail in the sum of 28,000 dollars. The principal then came to Pennsylvania
where he incurred debts which eventually resulted in a lawsuit. The sheriff ac-
quired custody of the principal but permitted him to go at large. The
Virginia bondsman then sent a deputy to apprehend the principal and return
him to Virginia. The deputy also acquired custody. In a hearing to decide
who had the right to custody of the principal, the court held that since the
bail and his deputy had permitted the principal to go at large within Penn-
sylvania, they must be charged with knowledge that he might incur debts
within the state; therefore, the principal must be remanded to the custody of
the sheriff. The court indicated, however, that this was but a limitation on
the recognized right of the bondsman to pursue and apprehend his principal
for return and surrender.
Another Pennsylvania case1 ° imposed a further limitation, although
under modern bankruptcy law such would probably fail. The court
in that case held that the bail could not return the principal from Pennsylvania
to Delaware by a bailpiece on a suit in debt where the principal had sub-
sequently been declared insolvent under a Pennsylvania Insolvency Act
and discharged from his debts. The court recognized, however, that ordinarily
4. Commonwealth v. Brickett, 8 Pick. 138 (1829).
5. Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84 (1819).
6. 60 Vt. 72, 11 AtI. 690 (1887).
7. Id. at -, 11 Atl. at 693.
8. 6 Leg. Gaz. 110 (Pa. 1874).
9. 2 Yeates 203 (Pa. 1798).
10. Commonwealth v. Riddle, 1 S. & R. 311 (Pa. 1815).
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the bondsman would have had the power to seize and return the principal to
Delaware. Another limitation was imposed in United States v. Bishop,"
where the court held that the power of the bondsman could be exercised only
after the termination of certain court-martial proceedings against his prin-
cipal in Virginia.
Justice Baldwin of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in
the Pennsylvania circuit, said by way of obiter in a case 12 dealing with a
runaway slave that:
The bail in a suit entered in another state, have a right to seize and
take the principal in a sister state, provided it does not interfere
with the interest of other persons who have arrested such princi-
pal.'
3
It is apparent then that the power of the bondsman over his principal is rec-
ognized in Pennsylvania, but is soundly limited in that the exercise of the
power must not interfere with or violate the interests of other persons within
the Commonwealth who obtained custody over the principal before apprehen-
sion by the bail.
The court in the Von der Ahe case14 followed Taylor v. Taintor15 and
pointed out that the custody of the bail over the principal was in effect a
continuance of the original imprisonment. Therefore, the bail may at any
time seize the principal and place him in prison until the time for surrender
under the bond. Moreover, this power could be exercised in person or by
agent and carries with it the right to arrest on the Sabbath and to
break and enter the principal's home for the purpose of apprehension. The
court analogized this power to the right of rearrest by a sheriff of an escap-
ing prisoner.
In Fitzpatrick v. Williams,'6 the principal was arrested by the police
in New Orleans on affidavits charging him with having committed an offense
in the state of Washington, and with being a fugitive from justice. While
the principal was in the custody of the sheriff of New Orleans, the bonding
company, who had been bail in Washington, intervened stating that it was
bail on a 1500 dollars bond furnished by the principal in the state of
Washington, and since the principal had fled that state, it had a right to his
custody for the purpose of returning him to Washington for surrender.
The principal then filed a writ of habeas corpus for his release. The
court denied the writ and ordered the sheriff to surrender the principal
to the bonding company or its agent. The court held that the right of a
11. 3 Yeates 37 (Pa. 1800).
12. 13 Fed. Cas. 841 (No. 7, 416) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833).
13. Id. at 846.
14. Supra note 1.
15. 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 366 (1873).
16. 46 Fed. 2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).
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surety of bail to capture his principal is not a matter of criminal procedure,
but arises from private rights established by the bail contract between the
principal and his surety. The court differentiated between the rights of the
bondsman and those of the state as follows:
If the state desires to reclaim a fugitive from its justice, in another
jurisdiction, it must proceed by way of extradition in default of a
voluntary return. It cannot invoke the right of a surety to seize
and surrender his principal, for this is a private and not a govern-
mental remedy. It is equally true that the surety, if he has the right,
is not required to resort to legal process to detain his principal for
the purpose of making surrender.
17
The court also reasoned that the bonding company would have no contractual
benefit if its rights of seizure of the principal were not accompanied by cor-
responding rights of return to the state in which the bond was furnished.
This reasoning, of course, further emphasizes' the contractual nature of the
bail bondsman's power in derogation of any theory of subrogation of the
rights of the state. The court in Fitzpatrick states uncategorically that bail
does not acquire the right of seizure and surrender from the state through
subrogation, because the state never had such powers.
A recent case construing the power of a bondsman to bring back an
absconding principal is that of Golla v. State.' The Supreme Court of
Delaware, in an appeal on a habeas corpus proceeding, held that where a
prisoner was taken into custody in Pennsylvania by Delaware police acting
as agents for a bondsmen under authority of a bailpiece issued in Delaware,
extradition proceeding in Pennsylvania were not required prior to the
prisoner's removal to Delaware. The court stated that it was not setting new
policy, but that it was declaring existing law when it held:
In our opinion, no extradition was necessary, since the prisoner
was taken into custody by agents of his bondsman, acting under
authority of a bail piece. It seems to be well established that a
bondsman seeking to deliver custody of the person for whom he is
responsible and who has obtained a bail piece, may pursue the fugi-
tive to any place within the jurisdictional limits of the United States
and take him into custody. Such arrest is not an action by the state,
and therefore no extradition is required. 19
It would seem then that the doctrine is well established. Strangely
enough, however, the historic reason for the vesting of such powers over
in the bail has long since disappeared. Originally, the bail would have had to
undergo any penalty or suffer any damages assessed against the principal if
17. Id. at 40.
18. - Del. -, 135 A.2d 137 (1957).
19. Id. at -, 135 A.2d at 139.
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the bail failed to produce the principal at the time for surrender.20 Today,
the power is justified as a contractual right and is defended on the grounds
that if this power is not conceded, bail would be discouraged. Accordingly,
it would be impossible to regain one's freedom after arrest pending trial or
hearing. Hence, regardless of the legal theory utilized to sustain this power
in the bail, its foundation on public policy is the real reason for its existence.
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